

estly doubt formation such Government would be taken as index of strength and believe GOT and GOM are aware serious legal and diplomatic consequences which recognition would entail

3. We therefore hope GOM and GOT will weigh matter long and carefully and in considering recommendations conference will lay great stress on consultative features which allow for delay and give room for maneuver and cool examination future courses action. If we agree desirable keep FLN within GOM and GOT orbit, we believe precipitate response to Party recommendations on Algerian Government might by prolonging hostilities and producing recognition by wrong quarters actually operate against this objective. We hope GOM and GOT will exercise all possible influence on FLN to bring her to realities of situation \*

4. Finally we continue desirous encouraging closer North African cooperation and hope good sense GOM and GOT will prevail in giving such cooperation most constructive form by keeping always in mind vital importance North Africa and Western Europe to one another

London inform FonOff above. Paris may act at discretion

Herter

\* At this point in the source text, the following paragraph was deleted in transmission

4. Re US aid to France, our assistance given in context widest Western cooperation and not for prosecution Algerian war. We sure GOM and GOT aware popular misperceptions this regard both as to real scope and purpose US aid. While we understand they have much in mind feelings North African peoples this matter, we cannot believe we be wise depart from our general policy avoiding use of aid programs as political pressure devices. Judging from attitudes GOM and GOT we believe they share this view.

## 276. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Herter met with President Eisenhower at the White House on May 2. Among other items, Dulles mentioned that the subject of Algeria might arise at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting to be held at Copenhagen May 5-7. I said that it was possible, although I thought unlikely, that the French might demand an expression of NATO solidarity behind French policy in Algeria. The President thought that it would be quite impractical to give any such blank check. We wanted a French policy that would succeed and we could not be bound to endorse elements of a policy